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THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THE 1983·84 TERM
Paul C. Giannelli
Professor of Law
Case Western Reserve University
The 1983-84 Term of the U.S. Supreme Court ended
on July 5, 1984. The most significant decisions handed down by the Court, U.S. v. Leon, 104 S.Ct. 3405
(1984), and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S.Ct.
3424 (1984), recognized a good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule. The last issue of the Reporter discussed these cases. This article summarizes some
of the Court's other criminal procedure cases.
ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Private Searches
The Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applies only to governmental searches; it does not apply to private searches. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 456 (1921). Nevertheless, a private search thathas been significantly
expanded by the police does fall within the purview
of the Fourth Amendment and thus triggers the warrant requirement. Walter v. U.S., 447 U.S. 649 (1980).
In U.S. v. Jacobsen, 104 S.Ct. 1652 (1984), Federal
Express employees observed a white powdery substance while examining a damaged package. They
notified a DEA agent and apparently repackaged the
substance. Upon his arrival, the agent removed the
substance and subjected it to a chemical test which
revealed the presence of cocaine. The defendant argued that the search was illegal because the agent
had failed to obtain a warrant, while the Government
contended that the field test did not change the private character of the search. The Eighth Circuit
agreed with the defendant.
On review, the Supreme Court reversed. The
Court's analysis involved three steps. First, the Court
found that the removal of the powder from the package did not violate any privacy interest because the
agent learned nothing more than what the private
employees had already revealed to him. Second, the
seizure of the package prior to testing was constitutionally permissible because an examination of the
Public Defender: Hyman Friedman

package provided probable cause for such a limited
seizure. Third, field testing did not implicate any
privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment:
A chemical test that merely discloses whether or not
a particular substance is cocaine does not compromise
any legitimate interest in privacy ... [E]ven if the results
are negative-merely disciosing that the substance is
something other than cocaine-such a result reveals
nothing of special interest. Congress had decided ... to
treat the interest in "privately" possessing cocaine as
illegitimate; thus governmental conduct that can reveal
whether a substance is cocaine, and no other arguably
"private" fact, compromises no legitimate privacy
interest. /d. at 1662.

Open Fields Doctrine
The "open fields" doctrine, first announced by the
Supreme Court in Hester v. U.S., 265 U.S. 57 (1924),
permits the police to enter and search a field without
a warrant. The continued validity of this doctrine,
however, was suspect after the Court decided Katz v.
U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Court in Katz held that
the Fourth Amendment applies whenever a person
has a reasonable expectation of privacy.
In Oliver v. U.S., 104 S.Ct. 1735 (1984), narcotics
officers entered the defendant's farm without a warrant and discovered marijuana. During their entry, the
officers walked around a locked gate which was posted with a "no trespassing" sign. In addition; the field
was secluded-bounded on all sides by woods,
fences, embankments and not observable from any
point of public access. The district court, citing Katz,
held that the defendant had a reasonable expectation
that the fields would remain private, a ruling that triggered the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.
On review, the Supreme Court disagreed. It reaffirmed the open fields doctrine, finding no conflict
between that doctrine and the Katz decision: "an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the
area immediately surrounding the home." 104 S.Ct at
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1741. In reaching this conclusion, the Court cited
three factors that are relevant to determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists: the intention of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment, the
uses to which a location is put, and the societal understanding that certain areas deserve protection
from government invasion. According to the Court,
none of these factors require Fourth Amendment
protection for open fields. Unlike a home, an open
field does not provide a setting for those intimate activities that the Framers intended to shelter from governmental interference. Moreover, there is no societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities, such as the cultivation of crops, that occur in
open fields. Finally, fences and "no trespassing"
signs generally do not effectively bar the public from
viewing open fields.

the installation. Moreover, the Court held that the
transfer of the can to the defendants did not violate
their right of privacy; the transfer "conveyed no information that Karo wished to keep private, for it conveyed no information at all." /d. at 3302. Consequently, there was no search. Nor was there a seizure,
because the defendants' possessory interest in the
cans were not interfered with in any meaningful way.
The Court, however, did find that monitoring the
beeper in a private residence, a location not open to
visual surveillance, violated the Fourth Amendment.
The warrantless use of the beeper, according to the
Court, was the equivalent of a warrantless entry into
the house. Although it is less intrusive than a fullscale search, it does reveal a critical fact about the
premises that the Government could not have otherwise learned without a warrant. This fact distinguished Karo from Knotts because in the latter case the
beeper revealed nothing about the interior of a
house. Moreover "[r]equiring a warrant will have the
salutary effect of ensuring that use of beepers is not
abused, by imposing upon agents the requirement
that they demonstrate in advance their justification
for the desired search." /d. at 3305.

Prison Searches
Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S.Ct. 3194 (1984), involved
the search of a prison cell, which the inmate
chaHenged on Fourth Amendment grounds. The case
required the Court to decide whether prisoners have
justifiable expectations of privacy in their cells. If
they do, the Fourth Amendment applies, at least in
some form. The Court, however, refused to recognize
Fourth Amendment rights in this context: "The
recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their individual cells simply cannot be reconciled with the
concept of incarceration and the needs and objectives of penal institutions." /d. at 3200. The Court's
holding rested on its view that security and other objectives could not be attained if the Fourth Amendment applied to prison cells: "Virtually the only place
inmates can conceal weapons, drugs, and other contraband is in their cells. Unfettered access to these
cells by prison officials, thus, is imperative if drugs
and contraband are to be ferretted out and sanitary
surroundings are to be maintained." /d.

Probable Cause -Informants
In the 1982-83 Term the Court in Illinois v. Gates, 103
S.Ct. 2317 (1983), overruled the Aguilar-Spinelli twoprong test for establishing probable cause. According
to those cases, information obtained from an informant could not establish probable cause for a search
unless the (1) basis of the informant's knowledge and
(2) reliability of his information were demonstrated.
Rejecting this two-prong test in Gates, the Court substituted a "totality of the circumstances" approach.
The lower courts have split on the meaning of Gates.
Some have interpreted Gates narrowly; others have interpreted it liberally. In a per curiam decision, Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S.Ct. 2085 (1984), the Supreme
Court summarily reversed one of the more stringent
applications of Gates. The Court wrote: "The Massachusetts court apparently viewed Gates as merely adding a new wrinkle to [the Aguilar-Spinelli] two-pronged
test: where an informant's veracity and/or basis of
knowledge are not sufficiently clear, substantial corroboration of the tip may save an otherwise invalid warrant." /d. at 2087. The Court went on to comment: "We
think that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts misunderstood our decision in Gates. We did not
merely refine or qualify the two-pronged test. Werejected it ... " /d. Instead of considering the informant's
information as a whole, the state court judged only
"bits and pieces of information in isolation against the
artificial standards provided by the two-pronged test."
/d. at 2088. Moreover, the state court failed to defer to
the trial court's judgment and instead conducted a de
novo review. According to the Court, "[a] deferential
standard of review is appropriate to further the Fourth
Amendment's strong preference for searches conduct
ed pursuant to a warrant." /d.

Beepers
In U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), the Court held
that the warrantless monitoring of an electronic
tracking beeper inside a container of chemicals did
not violate the Fourth Amendment when the information revealed could have been obtained by visual
surveillance. This Term, the Court in U.S. v. Karo, 104
S.Ct. 3296 (1984), decided several other issues
relating to beepers.
A beeper was installed in a can of ether with the
consent of the owner when DEA agents learned that
the defendants intended to use the ether to extract
cocaine from clothing imported into the country.
After the defendants purchased the cans of ether, including the one with the beeper, the agents maintained surveillance by means of the beeper for several
months, following the cans when they were moved
on several occasions. The agents eventually obtained a warrant and searched a house, discovering the
cocaine. Defendants moved to suppress the evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds.
On review, the Supreme Court held that the installation of the beeper in the can did not violate the
Fourth Amendment because the owner consented to

Automobile Exception
In Chambersv. Maroney,399 U.S.42(1970), the Court
held that the police could conduct a warrantless
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search of an aut om obi le when it has been stopped on
the road and there is probable cause to believe
evidence is in the car. Although this exception to the
warrant requirement was based on the mobility of the
car, the Court held that a search of the car at the police
station after it had been immobilized was also permissible. In a per curiam opinion, Florida v. Meyers, 104
S.Ct. 1852 (1984), the Court reaffirmed Chambers. In
Meyers the police searched a validly impounded car
eight hours after the defendant had been arrested and
his car seized. The Court ruled the search constitutional under Chambers and its progeny.

INTERROGATIONS

Miranda-Misdemeanor Cases
In Berkemer v. McCarty, 104 S.Ct. 3138 (1984), the
Court considered the applicability of Miranda to
misdemeanor traffic offenses. The Court refused to
recognize a "misdemeanor" exception, holding that
the Miranda requirements applied "regardless of the
nature or severity of the offenses of which [the defendant] is suspected or for which he was arrested."
/d. at 3148. According to the Court, a misdemeanor
exception would be difficult to apply because the
police often do not know whether a felony or misdemeanor has been committed at the time of arrest and
interrogation. Moreover, investigations which initially
focus on minor offenses sometimes escalate into investigations of serious crimes.
In order to decide the case, however, the Court was
required to address a second issue-whether the
roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant
to a routine traffic stop should be considered "custodial interrogation." The Miranda warnings are required
only during custodial interrogation. In resolving this
issue, the Court acknowledged that the stopping of an
automobile was a "seizure" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648 (1979). Miranda, however, is based on Fifth, not
Fourth, Amendment concerns-namely, the inherently coercive atmosphere associated with police interrogations. The Court found that these concerns were
not significant during the typical traffic stop because
such stops are of relatively short duration and occur in
public view, thus reducing the ability of an unscrupulous policeman to use illegitimate means to elicit selfincriminatory statements. Accordingly, the Court held
that traffic stops were not "custodial" within the
meaning of Miranda. 104 S.Ct. at 3151. The Court,
however, noted that a person subject to a traffic stop
could be treated in such a way as to render him "in
custody" for practical purposes, thereby triggering the
Miranda requirements. In determining when a stop has
been transformed into the functional equivalent of an
arrest, the Court used an objective test: "how a
reasonable man in the suspect's position would have
understood his situation." /d. at 3152.

Warrantless Arrests in Houses
In a 1980 case, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573
(1980), the Court had held that in the absence of exigent circumstances, a warrantless arrest in the home
violated the Fourth Amendment. At that time, however, the Court declined to consider what circumstances would qualify as "exigent." The Court addressed one aspect of this issue in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 104 S.Ct. 2091 (1984), where the police made a
warrantless night entry into the defendant's home in
order to arrest him for a nonjailable traffic offense.
After driving his car off the road, the defendant left
the scene and walked a short distance to his home.
When the police arrived at the scene, they learned of
the defendant's action from a witness, who opined that
the defendant was either inebriated or very sick. The
police obtained the defendant's address from the car's
registration and proceeded to his home without secur·
ing a warrant. The defendant's stepdaughter answered
the door, at which time the police proceeded to an
upstairs bedroom where they placed the defendant
under arrest for driving under the influence of an intoxicant. The state supreme court upheld the arrest
because it found a number of exigent circumstances:
the need for hot pursuit of a suspect, the need to prevent physical harm to the offender and the public, and
the need to prevent the destruction of evidence.
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. According to
the Court:
Before agents of the government may invade the sanctity of the home, the burden is on the government to
demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the
presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all
warrantless home entries .... When the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor offense, that presumption of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut, and the
government usually should be allowed to make such arrests only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by
a neutral and detached magistrate. /d. at 2098.

Miranda- The Public Safety Exception
In New York v. Quarles, 104 S.Ct. 2626 (1984), the
Court recognized a "public safety" exception to Miranda. The defendant in Quarles was arrested soon after
the police were informed by a rape victim that a man fitting his description had attacked her. The complaint
included the fact that the rapist had a gun. At the time
of his arrest, the defendant was wearing an empty
shoulder holster. After handcuffing the defendant, the
arresting officer asked where the gun was and the defendant responded, "the gun is over there." The trial
court excluded both the statement and the gun.
On review, the Supreme Court reversed, recognizing
for the first time a "public safety" exception to Miranda: "So long as the gun was concealed somewhere in
the supermarket, with its actual whereabouts unknown, it obviously posed more than one danger to thepublic safety: an accomplice might make use of it, a

In sum, the seriousness of the offense for which
the arrest is made is an important factor in evaluating the exigency of the situation. The possibility that
the blood-alcohol content would dissipate if the
police failed to act quickly was not a compelling
reason in light of the fact that the State treated firstoffender drunk driving as a noncriminal civil offense.
Moreover, there was no continuous hot pursuit from
the scene of the crime and the public safety was not
at risk because the defendant was already at home
and the car was abandoned.
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customer or employee might later come upon it." /d. at
2632. The Court went on to hold that in such a situation
the threat to the public safety outweighed the need for
Miranda's prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth
Amendment. Although the Court labeled the public
safety exception a "narrow exception," it failed to provide much guidance on its applicability.

v. U.S., 308 U.S. 338,341 (1939). The Court, however, has
r~cognized several exceptions to the derivative evidence doctrine. For example, the Court has held that if
knowledge of the "fruits" is gained from an "independent source" the evidence is admissible. Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. U.S., 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). Two of the
Court's cases this Term involved the derivative evidence doctrine. One case involved the traditional"independent source" exception; the other recognized a
new exception-the "inevitable discovery" rule.

Probation Officer Interrogations

I

i

Minnesota v. Murphy, 104 S.Ct. 1136 (1984), involved
the admissibility of statements made by a defendant
during a meeting with his probation officer. In 1974
Murphy was questioned by the police concerning a
rape-murder. No charges were brought at that time. In
1980 he was convicted of false imprisonment, an offense which arose from an unrelated sex episode. He
was placed on probation on the condition that he participate in a program for sexual offenders. A counselor
in the program subsequently informed his probation
officer that he had admitted committing the 1974 rapemurder. When confronted with this admission, Murphy
also confessed to the probation officer. He was subsequently indicted fort.hat crime and moved to suppress
his statements on Fifth Amendment grounds.

Independent Basis

In Segura v. U.S., 104 S.Ct. 3380 (1984), narcotics
. agents received information that the defendants
were trafficking in cocaine from their apartment.
Eventually, one of the defendants was arrested in the
lobby of the apartment building and was taken to the
apartment, at which time the police secured the
apartment until a search warrant could be obtained.
The agents conducted a limited security check of the
apartment and discovered some drug paraphernalia
in plain view. They then arrested the second defendantwho had been in the apartment, discovering additional evidence during a search incident to arrest.
The defendants were transported to DEA headquarters, while two agents remained in the apartment
awaiting the warrant. The warrant, however, was not
executed until19 hours after the initial entry. The
search conducted pursuant to the warrant revealed
drugs, weapons, and drug trafficking records.
The trial court ruled that the initial entry was illegal
because there had been no exigent circumstances to
justify a warrantless entry. Consequently, the evidence discovered during the inital entry and search incident to arrest were illegal"fruits." The court also
considered the evidence obtained in the search pursuant to the warrant as illegal"fruits" of the initial entry.
The Supreme Court accepted the lower court's
finding that the initial entry and search incident to
arrest were illegal and considered only the admissibility of the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant.
The Court held that although the entry into the apartment may have been illegal, the "seizure" of the
premises (even from within) based on probable cause
was not: "We hold ... that securing a dwelling, on
the basis of probable cause, to prevent the destruction of evidence or removal of evidence while a
search warrant is being sought is not itself an unreasonable seizure of either the dwelling or its contents." /d. at 3389. Accordingly, the evidence eventually seized by warrant was not tainted by the seizure
of the apartment. Furthermore, this evidence was obtained from a source independent of the illegal initial
entry. None of the evidence on which the warrant
was secured derived from this entry; it had been obtained prior to the entry.

On review, the Supreme Court rejected Murphy's
claim. Although he was subject to a number of restrictive conditions, he was not under arrest and was
free to leave arthe end of the meeting. Accordingly,
he was not in custody and thus had no right to
Miranda warnings.
In addition, the Court reiterated its long standing
position that the Fifth Amendment generally is not
self-executing; that is, a person subject to compulsion
must assert the Fifth Amendment privilege. Otherwise, his statements are considered voluntary. In reversing Murphy's conviction, the Minnesota Supreme
Court had cited a number of factors which it thought
justified an exception to this rule: (1) the probation officer could compel the defendant's attendance and
truthful answers, (2) the officer consciously sought incriminating evidence, (3) the defendant did not expect
to be questioned about the rape murder, and (4) no
observers were present to protect against abuse and
trickery. The Court found these factors unpersuasive.
According to the Court, most of these factors are present when a witness testifies before a grand jury and
Miranda has not been applied in that context.
Moreover, the meeting with the probation officer did
not present the same coercive atmosphere that is present during police interrogations.
Finally, the Court declined to find that the state
had applied an impermissible penalty to the defendant's exercise of his Fifth Amendment right. There
was no indication that under state law his probation
would be revoked because he claimed the Fifth
Amendment privilege.

Inevitable Discovery

In Nix v. Williams, 104 S.Ct. 2501 (1984), the Court
recognized for the first time that evidence unconstitutionally seized may nevertheless be admissible if it
would have been inevitably discovered by the police.
Williams was convicted of the murder of a ten-yearold girl. His first conviction was overturned by the
Supreme Court in 1977 because he was denied the

DERIVATIVE EVIDENCE

The Supreme Court has long held that the exclusionary rule applies not only to primary evidence obtained
as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure but also
to evidence later discovered and found to be derivative
of an illegality or"fruit of the poisonous tree." Nardone
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right to counsel at the time he made incriminating
statements that led to the discovery of the victim's
body. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). Although his inculpatory statements were not offered
in evidence at the retrial, the prosecution did introduce evidence concerning the location of the victim's body, its condition, articles and photographs of
clothing, and the results of postmortem medical and
chemical tests. Williams claimed that this evidence
was the "fruit" of his illegally obtained confession.
On review, the Supreme Court disagreed. As in
other recent cases, the Court began its analysis by
focusing on the deterrent effect of the exclusionary
rule. According to the Court, this deterrent effect is
notundercut by the recognition of an inevitable discovery rule: "If the prosecution can establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the information
ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered
by lawful means ... then the deterrence rationale
has so little basis that the evidence should be received." /d. at 2509. Here, the prosecution argued
that the victim's body would have been discovered
by a search party even if Williams had not made his
incriminatory admissions. Significantly, the Court
refused to recognize a good faith component to the
inevitable discovery rule. All that the prosecution is
required to show is that the evidence probably would
have been discovered, a finding that the Court said
was supported by the record in Williams' case.

formance must be "highly deferential." "It is all too
tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's
assistance after conviction or adverse sentence .... "
/d. at 2066. Accordingly, "a court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that
is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that,
under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might
be considered sound trial strategy.' "/d. at 2066-67.
In considering the second issue, the Court held
that counsel's performance, even if falling below prevailing norms, must prejudice the defense. The Court
adopted the following standard for judging prejudice:
"The defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
/d. at 2068. The Court, however, did recognize some
situations in which prejudice would be presumed, including instances of state interference with
counsel's role and conflicts of interest.
In U.S. v. Cronic, 104 S.Ct. 2039 (1984), the tria-l
court appointed a young lawyer with a real estate
practice to represent the accused and allowed him
only 25 days to prepare for trial on mail fraud
charges. The court of appeals found that the accused had been denied effective assistance of
counsel based on a number of factors: the time afforded for preparation, the experience of counsel, the
gravity of the charge, the complexity of possible
defenses, and the accessibility of witnesses.
The Supreme Court reversed. It did not question
the relevancy of any of these factors. Instead, the
Court held that the lower court improperly inferred
incompetency based on these factors. According to
the Court, a claim of ineffective assistance generally
can be established "only by pointing to specific errors made by trial counsel." /d. at 2051. Moreover,
these specific errors must adversely affect the trial:
"Absent some effect of challenged conduct on the
reliability of the trial process, the Sixth Amendment
guarantee is generally not implicated." /d. at 2046.
The Court remanded the case for such a determination.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

~ ln~~:c~~~r~:s:~:~~~portant"right to counsel cases
involved the appropriate standard for determining
whether a defendant has been denied the right to effective assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984), the Court defined that
standard. Although all the federal circuit courts and
most state courts had adopted the "reasonably effective assistance" standard in one formulation or
another, the Supreme Court had not directly considered the issue until Washington. The Court set forth
two requirements for an ineffectiveness claim:
"First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant
must show that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense." /d. at 2064.
As for the first issue-deficient representationthe Court adopted the reasonably effective assistance
standard. The defendant must establish that the representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. According to the Court, no specific guidelines can be articulated: "The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." /d. at 2065. The
~._-· ABA Standards are guides for determining what is rea' sonable, but they are only guides. The Sixth Amendment, in the Court's view, is not designed to improve
the quality of legal representation but rather to ensure
a fair trial. Moreover, judicial scrutiny of counsel's per-

Standby Counsel
In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), the
Court held that a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel included the right to conduct
one's own defense. The Court also held that a trial
court may appoint "standby counsel" to assist the
prose defendant in such as case. In McKaskle v.
Wiggins, 104 S.Ct. 944 (1984), the Court was called
upon to decide the role of standby counsel who is
appointed over a defendant's objection.
The Court identified two values underlying the right
of self-representation. The first is the defendant's
right to control the case presented to the jury: "The
prose defendant must be allowed to control the organization and content of his own defense, to make
motions, to argue points of law, to participate in voir
dire, to question witnesses, and to address the court
and the jury at appropriate points in the trial." /d. at
949. There was no question that Wiggins exercised
5

these rights at his trial. His principal argument was
that the standby counsel impaired his defense_by intrusive and unsolicited participation in the trial.
The second value underlying Faretta, according to
the Court, concerns the jury's perception of the defendant's control over the case: "[P]articipation by
standby counsel without the defendant's consent
should not be allowed to destroy the jury's perception
that the defendant is representing himself." /d. at 951.
As the Court poi"nted out, however, this value is not
undercut by counsel's participation in the trial outside
the presence of the jury. As long as the defendant is
given an opportunity to express his views to the trial
judge, this right is protected. The judge is presumed
capable of differentiating between the defendant's
and standby counsel's views on legal issues.
Participation by standby counsel in the presence
of the jury presents a more difficult question. Nevertheless, the Court refused to adopt a categorical ban
on counsel's participation before the jury. In evaluating whether counsel's involvement eroded the right
to self-representation in this context, the Court identified several factors. First, the defendant's conduct
in agreeing to counsel's participation is relevant.
Once the defendant invites participation, subsequent
appearances by counsel are presumed to be with the
defendant's acquiescence-at least, until he expressly requests counsel's silence. Second, counsel's participation in routine procedural and evidentiary issues does not infringe the right of self-representation.

precluded a subsequent in rem forfeiture proceeding
against those firearms. The Supreme Court rejected
his argument, adhering to the traditional view that
the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits only a second
criminal trial. According to the Court, "neither col·
lateral estoppel nor double jeopardy bars a civil,
remedial forfeiture proceeding initiated following an
acquittal on related criminal charges." /d. at 1104.
Death Penalty Acquittal
In Arizona v. Rumsey, 104 S.Ct. 2305 (1984), the
defendant was convicted of first degree murder and
armed robbery. The trial court sentenced him to life
imprisonment because it found the aggravating circumstances specified in the state death penalty
statute inapplicable. The defendant appealed on an
unrelated issue and the state filed a cross-appeal
on the death penalty issue. The state supreme court
agreed with the prosecution's view of the death
penalty statute and remanded for resentencing, at
which time the death penalty was imposed.
On review, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
issue was controlled by Bullington v. Missouri, 451
U.S. 430 (1981), in which it had held that the ordeal
and anxiety suffered at a capital sentencing proceeding was equivalent to that suffered in a trial on
the merits. Accordingly, the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited the resentencing of a
defendant to death after the sentencer has in effect
acquitted the defendant of that penalty, even if the
acquittal was based on legal error.

Initiation of the Right to Counsel
In U.S. v. Gouveia, 104 S.Ct. 2292 (1984), defendants who were serving sentences in a federal prison
were placed in administrative detention following the
murders of fellow inmates. They remained in detention for an extended period until they were indicted
on criminal charges. The court of appeals held that
the right to counsel attached when the defendants
were placed in administrative detention, even though
not yet indicted. The Supreme Court reversed, citing
prior cases which held that the right to counsel does
not attach until the commencement of adversary
judicial proceedings. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682
(1972). According to the Court, placement in administrative detention is not the initiation of judicial
adversary proceedings and thus the right to counsel
had not attached.

Guilty Pleas
In Ohio v. Johnson, 104 S.Ct. 2536 (1984), the defendant was indicted for murder, involuntary manslaughter, aggravated robbery, and grand theft. All
offenses arose from the killing of Thomas Hill and
the theft of property from his apartment. At arraignment, the defendant offered to plead guilty to the
manslaughter and theft counts. Over the prosecution's objection, the trial court accepted the pleas
and dismissed the remaining counts on Double
Jeopardy grounds, finding that manslaughter and
theft were lesser included offenses of murder and
robbery. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's decision.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. According to the
Court, although the Double Jeopardy Clause protects
a defendant against cumulatfve punishments for
convictions for ttie same offense, it does not prohibit
prosecution for such multiple offenses in a single
trial. Thus, for example, while the defendant may not
be punished separately for manslaughter and murder, he could be tried for both at the same time. The
Court also held that the multiple prosecution aspect
of the Double Jeopardy Clause would not be violated. The defendant had never been exposed to conviction on the more serious charges; the prosecution
was not seeking a second chance at conviction; and
the plea of guilty could not be considered an implied
acquittal of the more serious charges.

DOUBlE JEOPARDY
The Supreme Court decided a number of double
jeopardy cases this Term. The Court's prior cases
have recognized three separate guarantees embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause: It protects
against a second prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal, against a second prosecution for the
same offense after conviction, and against multiple
punishments for the same offense. Illinois v. Vitale,
447 U.S. 410 (1980).
Civil Suits Following Acquittal
In U.S. v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 104
S.Ct. 1099 (1984), a gun owner argued that his prior
acquittal on criminal charges involving firearms

Mistrials-Hung Jury
The jury trying the defendant in Richardson v. U.S.,
104 S.Ct. 3081 (1984), acquitted him of one count but
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dire examination of propsective jurors, the petitioner,
Press-Enterprise, moved that the voir dire be open to
the public. The prosecutor opposed the motion on
the grounds that the presence of the press would affect the candor of the prospective jurors' responses.
The trial court ruled to open only the general voir dire
to the public and press and to close the individual
voir dire. After the jury was empaneled, PressEnterprise moved for the release of the transcript of
the voir dire proceedings. The court denied this motion on the grounds it would impinge on the jurors'
right to privacy. Press-Enterprise sought a writ of
mandamus to compel the release of the transcript
and to vacate the closure order. The state courts
declined to grant relief.
On review, the Supreme Court reversed. According
to the Court, a presumption of openness attends
criminal trials. This presumption can only be overcome "by an overriding interest based on findings
that closure is essential to preserve higher values
and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." /d. at
824. Applying this standard to the facts, the Court
found that the record did not support the trial court's
findings that the defendant's right to a fair trial and
the jurors' right to privacy were jeopardized by an
open voir dire. Furthermore, the trial court had failed
to consider alternative ways to protect these interests. As an example, the Court pointed out that
the jurors could have been provided with an in
camera hearing to consider embarrassing questions.
In addition, sensitive material could have been
deleted from the transcript.

could not agree on other counts. The trial court
therefore declared a mistrial and the defendant
claimed that a second trial would violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause because the evidence on theremaining counts was insufficient for conviction. The
defendant relied on Burks v. U.S., 437 U.S. 1 (1978), in
which the Supreme Court had held that if a defendant obtained an unreversed appellate ruling that the
evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to convict, a second .trial was precluded by the Double
Jeopardy Clause. In short, a finding of insufficient
evidence is equivalent to an acquittal. The Supreme
Court, however, refused to extend Burks to the defendant's case. Instead, the Court adhered to its long
established rule that a retrial following a hung jury
does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. See
Logan v. U.S., 144 U.S. 263, 297-98 (1892).
Sentencing After Retrial
In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), the
Court held that neither the Double Jeopardy nor
Equal Protection Clauses precluded an increased
sentence on retrial following a successful appeal.
The Court, however, did hold that due process prohibited an increased sentence on retrial where the
enhanced sentence resulted from vindictive retaliation by the trial judge. According to the Court, such
vindictiveness might chill a defendant's right to appeal. Thus, an increased sentence on retrial is presumptively vindictive but this presumption can be
rebutted by reasons set forth in the record.

The defendant in Wasman v. U.S., 104 S.Ct. 3217
-~ (1984), was convicted of making a false statement in
a passport application and sentenced to a 2-year partially suspended sentence with probation. After his
conviction was overturned, he was retried and convicted. This time he was sentenced to two years imprisonment, none of which was suspended. The increased punishment resulted from a conviction for a
different crime, which was adjudged after the first
trial. In Wasman the Court found the presumption of
vindictiveness applicable. It also found, however,
that the record contained reasons which rebutted the
presumption-namely, the intervening conviction.

Sixth Amendment Right to Public Trial
In addition to the First Amendment right of access,
the closing of a criminal trial implicates an accused's
right to a public trial. In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,
443 U.S. 368 (1979), the Supreme Court commented:
"The requirement of a public trial is for the benefit of
the accused; that the public may see he is fairly dealt
with and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence of interested spectators may keep his triers
keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to
the importance of their functions .... " /d. at 380.
In Wallerv. Georgia, 104 S.Ct. 2210 (1984), the
Court held that the right to a public trial extends to
suppression hearings. The hearing could be closed
over a defendant's objection only if the standards of
Press-Enterprise have been satisfied: "[T]he party
seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the
closure must be no broader than necessary to protect the interest, the trial court must consider
reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding,
and it must make findings adequate to support the
closure." /d. at 2216.

OPEN TRIALS
First Amendment Right of Access
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555 (1980), the Supreme Court recognized a First
Amendment right of access to criminal trials: "We
hold that the right to attend criminal trials is implicit
in the guarantees of the First Amendment; without
the freedom to attend such trials ... important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could be
eviscerated." /d. at 580. In a subsequent case, the
Court held that the mandatory closure of a trial durin'g the testimony of a sex offense victim was unconstitutional. Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior Court,
457 U.S. 596 (1982). The Court returned to the open
trial issue last Term.
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 104 S.Ct.
819 (1984), involved a rape-murder trial in which the
defendant was sentenced to death. Prior to the voir

PREVENTIVE DETENTION
In Schall v. Martin, 104 S.Ct. 2403 (1984), the Court
upheld the constitutionality of preventive detention
for accused juvenile delinquents. The question left
unanswered is whether preventive detention for
adults is also constitutional. Much of the rationale
underlying Martin centers on juvenile court proceed-
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ings. Although the Court recognized the applicability
of the Due Process Clause to juvenile proceedings, it
also recognized the State's parens patriae interest in
protecting the welfare of children. At one point the
Court distinguished between juveniles and adults by
stating that the child's liberty interest "must be qualified by the recognition that juveniles, unlike adults,
are always in some form of custody." /d. at 2410.
Other parts of the opinion, however, could be cited
to support preventive detention for adults. The Court
held that preventive detention served a legitimate
state objective-the "legitimate and compelling state
interest in protecting the community from crime." In
addition, the Court rejected the view that it is virtually
impossible to predict future criminal conduct with any
degree of accuracy: "[F]rom a legal point of view there
is nothing inherently unattainable abqut a prediction
of future criminal conduct." /d. at 2417.

The Court was careful to distinguish Johnson frorr
its earlier decision in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S
257 (1971). The defendant in that case entered the pie<
which was accepted by the trial court before the prose
cutor attempted to renege on the agreement. "It
follows that when the prosecution breaches its prom
ise with respect to an executed plea agreement, the
defendant pleads guilty on a false premise, and hencE
his conviction cannot stand ... " 104 S.Ct. at 2547.
RIGHT OF PRESERVATION
California v. Trombetta, 104 S.Ct. 2528 (1984), concerned a defendant's right to have breath samples
preserved after he had been given an intoxilyzer test
to determine his blood-alcohol content. The defendant argued that such a right was derived from the
Due Process Clause. In prior cases, the Court had
held that due process requires the State to disclose
to criminal defendants favorable evidence that is
material either to guilt or to punishment. U.S. v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.

PROSECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS
The defendant in Thigpen v. Roberts, 104 S.Ct.
2916 (1984), was involved in a car accident in which a
oassenger died. As a result, he was convicted offour
misdemeanors in a Justice of the Peace Court and
appealed. Under state law, he was entitled to a trial
de novo in the Circuit Court. While the appeal was
pending, a grand jury indicted him for manslaughter
based on the same incident and he was subsequently convicted.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the case
was governed by Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21
(1974). In Perry the Court found a due process violation where the prosecution obtained an indictment
after a defendant exercised his right to appeal and
obtain a trial de novo. According to the Court, a defendant's right to appeal would be chilled if the prosecution could obtain an indictment in retaliation for
the exercise of the right to appeal. In order to
preclude this resul.t, the Court established a rebuttable presumption of unconstitutional vindictiveness
in these circumstances. Since the record in Roberts
failed to contain evidence rebutting this presumption, the Court reversed.

83 (1963).

The Court began its analysis by stating that it had
"never squarely addressed the Government's duty to
take affirmative steps to preserve evidence on behal1
of criminal defendants." 104 S.Ct. at 2533. The Court
refused to recognize such a right, at least in this con·
text. There was no evidence that the police destroyed evidence for the purpose of avoiding the
Brady disclosure requirements. Moreover, "[w]hatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to
preserve evidence, that duty must be limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant
role in the suspect's defense." /d. at 2534. In order to
meet this requirement, the "evidence must possess
an exculpatory value that was apparent before the
evidence was destroyed, and also be of a nature that
the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable
evidence by other reasonably available means." /d.
Neither condition is satisfied with breath samples.
Given the accuracy of the intoxilyzer the breath samples ar13 rnQre likely to be inculpatory than exculpatory. Moreover, the defendant has other means of
challenging the evidence. Under state law, he had
the right to inspect both the machine and the weekly
calibration results. Other sources of error, such as
radio waves and the presenc.e of chemicals in the
blood of people dieting, can be challenged by the
introduction of evidence at trial.

PLEA BARGAINS-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
In Mabry v. Johnson, 104 S.Ct. 2543 (1984), the
Court considered whether a defendant's acceptance
of a prosecutor's proposed plea bargain creates a
constitutional right to specific performance of that
bargain. The bargain was withdrawn by the prosecutor after it was accepted by the defendant, but before
the defendant pled guilty. The defendant later pled
guilty to a different bargain. According to the Court,
a "plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional significance; in itself it is a mere executory
agreement which, until embodied in a judgment of a
court, does not deprive an accused of liberty or any
other constitutionally protected interest. It is the ensuing guilty plea that implicates the Constitution." ld
at 2546. Since the defendant's subsequent plea was
voluntary, there was no constitutional violation.

CONCLUSION
The Court's decisions this Term continue to evidence the conservative trend of recent years. Many
of the landmark decisions of the Warren Court era
have been eroded. The good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule and the public safety exception to
Miranda are prime examples. In addition, the present
majority appears to seek out and reverse those lower
court decisions that extend constitutional protections to criminal defendants. There seems little
reason to believe that this trend will not continue.
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